Unclench Our Fist to Iran and Extend Our Hand? Intel Report Whispers "Good Luck, Mr. President"

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On March 3rd, 2007, the Chicago Sun-Times posted a report which quoted then presidential hopeful Senator Barack Obama as saying:

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad "reckless, irresponsible and inattentive" to the day-to-day needs of the Iranian people.

The Iranian "regime is a threat to all of us," Obama said.

While Obama wouldn't rule out force, he said the United States should engage in "aggressive diplomacy combined with tough sanctions" to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threat.

The President's current approach to dealing with Iran may sound inviting, but the task borders on the impossible, considering that country's current goals, as outlined in the unclassified intelligence report summary released 02/12/09.

Below is a quote from the full transcript of Hisham Melhem's interview with President Obama on Al Arabiya TV, 1/27/09 with his comments concerning Iran:

But I do think that it is important for us to be willing to talk to Iran, to express very clearly where our differences are, but where there are potential avenues for progress. And we will over the next several months be laying out our general framework and approach. And as I said during my inauguration speech, if countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.

What are the "potential avenues for progress" in the obvious "differences" our country's have?

The below excerpt is from the Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence . It outlines the latest status on Iran's government, tactics, motives and affiliations. The unclassified version anyway. I emphasis some pertinent "differences" that will need dealt with:

The Changing Geopolitical Landscape in the Middle East

In the Middle East, the revival of Iran as a regional power, the deepening of ethnic,
sectarian, and economic divisions across much of the region, and looming leadership succession among US allies are shaping the strategic landscape. Hizballah and HAMAS have successfully seized the mantle of resistance to Israel from moderate regimes with secular Arab nationalists being discredited in the popular mind. Battle lines are increasingly drawn not just between Israel and Arab countries but also between secular Arab nationalists and ascendant Islamic nationalist
movements inside moderate Arab states. Iran’s influence in Iraq, its enduring strategic ties to Syria, pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and the success of Tehran’s allies—HAMAS and Hizballah—are fueling Iran’s aspirations for regional preeminence. Arab Sunni leaders are struggling to limit Iran’s gains; Saudi Arabia’s more activist regional diplomacy falls short of significantly constraining Iran’s freedom of maneuver. Iran’s ambitions combined with unresolved conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories represent the principal flashpoints for intensified conflict in the region. Iran’s longstanding foreign policy goals are to preserve the Islamic regime, safeguard Iran’s sovereignty, defend its nuclear ambitions, and expand its influence in the region and the Islamic world. Iranian leaders perceive that regional developments—including the removal of Saddam and the Taliban, challenges facing the Untied States in Iraq and Afghanistan, the increased influence of HAMAS and Hizballah, and, until recently, higher oil revenues—have given Tehran more opportunities and freedom to pursue its objective of becoming a regional power. This perception has produced a more assertive Iranian foreign policy in which Tehran has focused on expanding ties in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Levant to better influence and exploit regional political, economic, and security developments. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapon capability is another element in its more assertive foreign policy—an aspect that I will discuss later.

In Tehran, Iran’s conservative faction continues to dominate the government. Supreme Leader Khamenei has consolidated political power in his office, but his reliance on hardline conservative elements—the IRGC, war veterans turned politicians such as President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad, and selected clerics—to bolster his authority has upset the earlier factional balance in Iranian politics.

• Although the regime still comprises many competing factions, only those that support the concept of a powerful Supreme Leader and advocate revolutionary values now have a significant voice in decisionmaking. President Ahmadi-Nejad faces less than certain prospects for reelection in June because his management of the economy and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric have become sources of significant domestic criticism and political friction. Ahmadi-Nejad’s economic policies have reduced unemployment marginally, but have fueled significant inflation, providing his critics ample ammunition to question his competence. The sharp fall in global oil prices will add to Iran’s economic problems, but Tehran has a substantial cushion of foreign reserves to support social and other spending priorities. Less energy revenues may also help to dampen its foreign policy adventurism. We expect Khamenei will attempt to manipulate the presidential election, largely by limiting the range of candidates. As he has in past elections, the Supreme Leader probably will attempt to influence the decisions of individuals to run, monitor the vetting and approval of candidates, and influence media coverage of the campaign.

• We do not know if Khamenei will actively support Ahmadi-Nejad’s re-election. The
Supreme Leader publicly has expressed support for Ahmadi-Nejad’s administration, but we judge his statements are intended more to minimize criticisms of the regime than to endorse the President.

• Although we expect that whoever is elected will be a strong supporter of the Islamic
Republic, we note that the election of a more pragmatic figure may, over time, produce some moderation of Iranian behavior by introducing into the decisionmaking process a wider range of options than those presented under Ahmadi-Nejad.
Militarily, Iran continues to strengthen the three pillars of its strategic deterrence: surface-to-surface missiles, long-range rockets and aircraft for retaliation; naval forces to disrupt maritime traffic through key waterways; and unconventional forces and surrogates to conduct worldwide lethal operations. Although many of their statements are exaggerations, Iranian officials throughout the past year have repeatedly claimed both greater ballistic missile capabilities that could threaten US and allied interests and the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz using unconventional small boat operations, anti-ship cruise missiles, and other naval systems. Some officials, such as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari-Najafabadi, have hinted that Iran would have a hand in attacks on “America’s interests even in far away places,” suggesting Iran has contingency plans for unconventional warfare and terrorism against the United States and its allies. Iran’s goals in Iraq include preventing the emergence of a threat from Iraqi territory, either from the government of Iraq itself, or from the United States. To achieve this, Iran probably seeks a government in Baghdad in which Tehran’s Shia allies hold the majority of political, economic, and security power. Iran also has sought to make the United States suffer political, economic, and human costs in order to limit US engagement in the region and to ensure that Washington does not maintain a permanent military presence in Iraq or use its military to pressure or attack Iran.

• Iranian efforts to secure influence in Iraq encompass a wide range of activities, including using propaganda, providing humanitarian assistance, building commercial and economic ties, and supporting Shia elements fighting the Coalition. Iran has provided a variety of Shia militants with lethal support including weapons, funding, training, logistical and operational support, and intelligence training.

• We judge Iran will continue to calibrate its lethal aid to Iraqi Shia militants based on the threat it perceives from US forces in Iraq, the state of US-Iran relations, Tehran’s fear of a Ba’thist resurgence, Tehran’s desire to help defend Iraqi Shia against sectarian violence, and to maintain the ability to play a spoiler role in Iraq if Iran perceives the government of Iraq has become a strategic threat.

• Despite Tehran’s efforts, we judge Iraqi nationalism and the growing capabilities of the Iraqi government will limit Iranian influence in Iraq. Baghdad, for example, signed the US-Iraq security agreement despite Iranian opposition.

In Afghanistan, Iran has focused on promoting a friendly central government in Kabul and limiting Western power and influence. Iran’s policy in Afghanistan follows multiple tracks, including providing political and economic support to the Karzai government and developing relationships with actors across the political spectrum.

• Iran has opposed Afghan reconciliation talks with the Taliban as risking an increase in the group’s influence and legitimacy.

• We judge Iran distrusts the Taliban and opposes its return to power but uses the provision of lethal aid as a way to pressure Western forces, gather intelligence, and build ties that could protect Iran’s interests if the Taliban regains control of the country.

In the Levant, Tehran is focused on building influence in Lebanon and expanding the
capability of key allies. Tehran continues to support groups such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which it views as integral to its efforts to challenge Israeli and Western influence in the Middle East.

• Hizballah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and weaponry, and Iran’s senior leadership has cited Hizballah as a model for other militant groups. We assess Tehran has continued to provide Hizballah with significant amounts of funding, training, and weapons since the 2006 conflict with Israel, increasing the group’s capabilities to pressure other Lebanese factions and to threaten Israel.

• Iran’s provision of training, weapons, and money to HAMAS since the 2006 Palestinian elections has bolstered the group’s ability to strike Israel and oppose the Palestinian Authority.